Inducing self-selection among different segments of consumers is an important issue in pricing. Some firms induce self-selection by offering a menu of two-part tariffs (e.g., different rate plans) and letting consumers select the tariff and quantity they prefer. Other firms induce selfselection by offering a menu of price-quantity bundles (e.g., different package sizes) and letting consumers select only from among these bundles. We show that bundling is more profitable absent cost considerations. Social welfare may be higher or lower with bundling.
I. INTRODUCTION
AIRLINE COMPANIES DISCRIMINATE between business and leisure travelers by offering different classes of service, e.g., first class and coach class, and by requiring Saturday-night stays and advance purchases. Credit card companies discriminate among customers by offering gold, silver, and platinum cards that differ in annual fees, interest rates, and credit limits.
1
Phone companies offer different rate plans to discriminate between heavy and light users of long-distance service.
2 Consumer-goods products often come in different package sizes. Restaurants offer large and small size drinks.
In each of these examples, the firms know something about the aggregate distribution of their consumers' demand preferences, and they can identify distinct market segments, but they cannot distinguish ex-ante to which segment a given consumer belongs. Thus, if a firm wants to engage in price discrimination, it has no choice but to offer the same menu of options to all r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
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0022-1821 Volume LI September 2003 No. 3 consumers and to price the menu so as to induce consumers to reveal their identity by the option they select. Inducing self-selection among consumer segments is an important issue in pricing, and the technique for implementing it is well known: the firm must ensure that each consumer selects the option designed for her and not the option designed for another consumer. For example, the consumer to whom the gold card is targeted must find that the savings from paying a lower annual fee on the other cards is more than offset by the reduction in their amenities. The consumer to whom the large-size drink option is targeted must find that the savings from the lower price on the small-size drink option is more than offset by the reduction in quantity. And the consumer to whom the high monthly fee is targeted must find that the savings from the lower per-unit price more than offsets the gain from the option with the lower monthly fee and higher per-unit price.
Yet less is known about the optimal method of inducing selfselection, both from a profitability standpoint and from a social welfare perspective. In this paper, we derive conditions under which it is more profitable for a firm to offer a menu of price-quantity bundles (e.g., different package sizes) than a menu of two-part tariffs (e.g., different rate plans). We also consider which is better for social welfare. Although we focus on the case of two consumer types that differ in their quantity demanded of a product of fixed quality, our model also applies to the case where consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality of a product of fixed quantity.
We find that, absent cost considerations, profits are higher with bundling than with two-part tariffs as long as standard single-crossing conditions apply and as long as it is optimal to serve all consumers at least some output. Thus, for example, with two consumer types, a firm can earn higher profit when consumers choose between two package sizes than when they choose between two payment schedules, one with a high fixed fee and low per-unit price and the other with a low fixed fee and high per-unit price. Analogously, if the two consumer types differ in their willingness to pay for quality, a firm can earn higher profit by offering a fixed product line of two qualities than by offering a menu of two pricing schedules that allow consumers to customize their quality needs.
Because bundling is more efficient than two-part tariffs at inducing selfselection, one might think that bundling would also be better for social welfare, causing the least distortion in the low-demand consumer's quantity. 3 However, we show that, depending on the shape of the demand curves, either pricing mechanism may be socially preferred. In the special case where the high-demand consumers' demand is a parallel shift out of the low-demand consumers' demand, the two methods of inducing self-selection yield the same social welfare. Surprisingly, the social-welfare ranking of the two mechanisms is independent of the number or proportion of each type of consumer. Faulhaber and Panzar (1977) were the first to rank methods of inducing self-selection in terms of profitability. They showed that, absent cost considerations, inducing self-selection from a menu of two-part tariffs is equivalent to inducing self-selection from a declining block rate tariff structure. However, they did not compare these methods to optimal menus of bundles. Murphy (1977) discussed two-part tariffs along with bundling, and conjectured that bundling would be more profitable than two-part tariffs with equal numbers of high and low-demand consumers. Spence (1980) made a similar conjecture about bundling in section 4 of his seminal work but then incorrectly concluded that the quantity consumed by the lowdemand consumers would on average be higher with the optimal menu of bundles than with the optimal menu of two-part tariffs.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the firm's problem and solve first for the profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs and second for the profit-maximizing menu of price-quantity bundles. We then compare the firm's profit in the two cases. In Section 3, we consider whether social welfare is higher or lower with bundling than with two-part tariffs. In Section 4, we discuss the analogy to products of different qualities and offer concluding remarks.
II. THE MONOPOLIST'S PROBLEM
Let us consider the case where a monopolist produces a single good at constant marginal cost c and faces a demand composed of heterogenous consumers. For now, we assume consumers differ in their consumption preferences according to a taste parameter y (the model easily extends to consumers with differing tastes for quality.) A consumer of type y derives utility V(q, y) from consumption of q40 units of the good and 0 otherwise. The following restrictions are imposed on V(q, y): For simplicity, we assume there are two groups (types) of consumers. The lowdemand group has taste parameter y 1 and occurs in proportion l2 ½0; 1; and the high-demand group has taste parameter y 2 and occurs in proportion (1 À l).
We assume y 2 4y 1 . Given constant marginal costs of production, the number of consumers can be normalized to one without loss of generality.
The restrictions in (1) imply that utility is increasing in q but at a diminishing rate (this ensures that demand is downward sloping). The restrictions in (2) imply that utility is increasing in y (this is a normalization) and that the demand curve of a high-demand consumer is weakly above the demand curve of a low-demand consumer (this satisfies the well known single-crossing condition). Figure 1 illustrates the demand curves facing the monopolist. Let q e 1 denote the quantity that satisfies q Vðq;y 1 Þ¼ c, and let q e 2 denote the quantity that satisfies q Vðq;y 2 Þ¼ c. Assume resale among consumers is prohibitively costly so that there is no resale market. Then, if the monopolist can distinguish among consumers, it can extract all surplus by charging a perunit price of c to both types, a fixed fee of A to the low-demand type, and a fixed fee of A þ B to the high-demand type. Alternatively, the monopolist can extract all surplus by offering a bundle of q e 1 units at a price of A þ cq e 1 to the low-demand type, and a bundle of q e 2 units at a price of A þ B þ cq e 2 to the high-demand type. In this case, absent cost considerations, the monopolist will be indifferent between the profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs and the profit-maximizing menu of bundles.
However, if the monopolist cannot distinguish among consumers, then it will in general not be able to extract all the potential surplus. The reason is that the monopolist must then offer the same deal or deals to all consumers, taking into account the possibility of personal arbitrage (a consumer of one type chooses an option meant for another type). 4 In particular, the monopolist must choose the terms of its offer to prevent a high-demand consumer from mimicking a low-demand consumer, and this limits the amount of surplus the monopolist can extract. As we shall see, this also breaks the monopolist's indifference between two-part tariffs and bundling.
Menus of Two-part Tariffs
Suppose the monopolist offers a menu of two-part-tariffs ((p 1 , F 1 ), (p 2 , F 2 )), where p i denotes the per-unit price and F i is the fixed fee, i 5 1, 2, with (p 1 , F 1 ) meant for the low-demand consumer and (p 2 , F 2 ) meant for the highdemand consumer. 
subject to the low-demand consumer purchasing a positive quantity,
and the high-demand consumer choosing to purchase under (p 2 , F 2 ) rather than (p 1 , F 1 ),
Because the maximand in (3) is increasing in F 1 and F 2 , it follows that F 1 will be chosen to satisfy (4) with equality and that, given F 1 , F 2 will be chosen to satisfy (5) with equality. 5 Since Vðq Ã 1 ðp 1 Þ; y 2 Þ4Vðq Ã 1 ðp 1 Þ; y 1 Þ, this implies that a low-demand consumer will derive no net surplus from consumption of the product while a high-demand consumer will derive positive net surplus.
To determine the profit-maximizing per-unit prices, we can substitute the fixed fees obtained in this way into the maximand in (3) and differentiate to 4 In what follows, we assume that the monopolist wants to serve both consumer types. That is, we assume that selling to the high-demand consumers only is less profitable than selling to both types. See Salant (1989) for a characterization of the necessary and sufficient conditions for discrimination to be optimal in the two-type case.
5 For completeness, there are two other constraints that should be mentioned: the highdemand consumer must want to purchase a positive quantity, and the low-demand consumer must not want to choose the option intended for the high-demand consumer. The latter constraint clearly never binds, and the former constraint is also not a problem. Since a highdemand consumer can always mimic a low-demand consumer and earn at least as high a surplus, the high-demand consumer purchases a positive quantity.
obtain the first-order conditions:
The expression in (6) implies that the profit-maximizing price to the highdemand consumers must equal the firm's marginal cost. Thus, there is no distortion at the top. However, there is a distortion at the bottom. To see this, note that the left-hand side of the expression in (7) consists of two terms. It is the existence of the second term, ð1 À lÞ q
, that causes a distortion in the price to a low-demand consumer. Since a high-demand consumer consumes more at any given price than a low-demand consumer, we have that q Ã 2 ðp 1 Þ À q Ã 1 ðp 1 Þ40, which implies that the profit-maximizing price to the low-demand consumers will exceed the firm's marginal cost.
It follows that high-demand consumers will consume the efficient quantity q e 2 , while low-demand consumers will consume less than q e 1 . This result is well known in the price discrimination literature and the intuition is straightforward. The firm is constrained by the possibility that a high-demand consumer will choose the option meant for the low-demand consumer. To relax this constraint, the firm must distort the low-demand type's consumption downward (a high-demand consumer suffers more from a quantity reduction than a low-demand consumer), making it less tempting for the high-demand consumer to choose. Conversely, the high-demand consumers' consumption is not distorted because the low-demand consumers' personal-arbitrage constraint is never binding.
Let ððp
ÞÞ solve the monopolist's problem in (3)- (5), and let T
denote the amount paid to the monopolist by a lowdemand consumer. Define T Ã 2 analogously. Then the monopolist's maximized profit given the optimal menu of two-part tariffs is
ÞÞ: Bundling
Now suppose the monopolist offers a menu of bundles ððq 1 ; T 1 Þ; ðq 2 ; T 2 ÞÞ, where q i denotes the bundled quantity of the good and T i is its price, with (q 1 , T 1 ) meant for the low-demand consumer and (q 2 , T 2 ) meant for the high-demand consumer.
6 Then the monopolist's problem is ð8Þ max
and the high-demand consumer choosing the bundle q 2 at price T 2 rather than q 1 at price T 1 ,
Because the maximand in (8) is increasing in T 1 and T 2 , it follows that T 1 will be chosen to satisfy (9) with equality and that, given T 1 , T 2 will be chosen to satisfy (10) with equality. As in the case with a menu of two-part tariffs, a low-demand consumer will derive no net surplus from consumption of the product while a high-demand consumer will derive positive net surplus.
To determine the profit-maximizing quantities, we can substitute the T 1 and T 2 obtained in this way into the maximand in (8) and differentiate to obtain the first-order conditions:
The expression in (11) implies that the profit-maximizing quantity to the high-demand consumers is the efficient quantity q e 2 (thus, there is no distortion at the top). The left-hand side of the expression in (12) consists of two terms. It is the existence of the second term, ð1 À lÞ
that causes a distortion in the quantity to a low-demand consumer. Since a high-demand consumer is assumed to have higher utility at any given quantity than a low-demand consumer, we have that
which implies that the profit-maximizing quantity to the low-demand consumers is less than the efficient quantity q e 1 (thus, there is a distortion at the bottom).
Let ðð1 ;T T 1 Þ; ð2 ;T T 2 ÞÞ solve the monopolist's problem in (8)- (10). Then the monopolist's maximized profit given the optimal menu of price-quantity bundles is
BUNDLING AND MENUS OF TWO-PART TARIFFS
Bundling versus menus of two-part tariffs
We have looked at two pricing mechanisms a monopolist might use to exploit consumer self-selection: bundling and two-part tariffs. The two mechanisms share some common features. In both cases, the quantity consumed by a high-demand consumer is efficient, and the quantity consumed by a low-demand consumer is distorted downward. However, there are also significant differences. As we will now show, absent cost considerations, neither the monopolist's maximized profit nor social welfare will in general be the same in the two cases. We begin by comparing profits. We know from the revelation principle that there is no loss of generality in restricting the monopolist's attention to direct revelation mechanisms in which consumers are induced to reveal their type truthfully. Since direct revelation mechanisms are simply menus of price-quantity bundles that have at most as many options as the number of consumer types, any direct revelation mechanism can be implemented as a simple bundling mechanism and vice versa.
7 Hence, it follows from the revelation principle that the profit-maximizing bundling mechanism achieves the highest possible profit over all pricing mechanisms, and thus that bundling must be weakly superior to two-part tariffs: p B !p 2PT . However, the revelation principle does not imply that bundling strictly outperforms two-part tariffs. Murphy (1977) conjectured that bundling would outperform two-part tariffs whenever there were equal numbers of high and low demand consumers. We now prove his conjecture and extend it to include any number of consumers and proportion of each type. 8 Proposition 1. The profit-maximizing menu of price-quantity bundles yields strictly higher profit than the profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs. That is, p B 4p 2PT .
Proof. We show that there exists a menu of bundles that replicates the profit-maximizing two-part tariff quantities, gives strictly higher payoff, and satisfies the constraints in (9) and (10). Let e be an arbitrarily small positive number and consider the menu of bundles ððq
Assume, for now, that this menu is feasible, i.e., it satisfies the constraints in (9) and (10). Then, by choosing this 7 The expression 'revelation principle' first appeared in Myerson (1981) . For earlier discussions of the principle's implications, see Myerson (1979) and Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) . For an up-to-date discussion of its applicability in principal-agent models with asymmetric information, see Laffont and Martimort (2002) .
8 Spence (1980) offered an incomplete proof of Murphy's conjecture. He showed that the quantities and prices in the profit-maximizing menu of bundles could not be induced by a feasible menu of two-part tariffs, but did not show that the induced quantities and payments in the profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs could be induced by a feasible menu of bundles. Spence also interpreted his findings incorrectly, as we shall see in Section 3. menu, the monopolist could have had a profit of
Since the monopolist did not choose the menu ððq
2 þ eÞÞ, but instead maximized its profit with the menu ðð1 ;T T 1 Þ, ð2 ;T T 2 ÞÞ, it follows that p B !p e . Thus, it follows that p B 4p 2PT . To complete the proof, it remains to show that the menu ððq
þ eÞÞ satisfies the constraints in (9) and (10). We relegate this part of the proof to the appendix. QED
The proof of Proposition 1 suggests how a firm that is inducing selfselection with a menu of two-part tariffs can implement an increase in its profit. Regardless of the induced quantity choices of the low and highdemand consumers given the menu of two-part tariffs employed by the firm, the firm can do strictly better by offering these same quantities as bundles at prices such that the amount collected from the low-demand consumers is unchanged and the amount collected from the high-demand consumers is increased by a small amount. As shown in the proof, this menu of pricequantity bundles satisfies the self-selection constraints and leads to strictly higher profit.
Bundling does better than a menu of two-part tariffs because it constrains the amount of surplus a high-demand consumer can obtain if she chooses the option meant for a low-demand consumer. To see this, suppose a highdemand consumer were to choose the option meant for a low-demand consumer. Then, with bundling, she would be forced to consume the same quantity that a low-demand consumer would consume, whereas with a menu of two-part tariffs, she could reoptimize to a higher quantity and increase the amount of surplus she could obtain (reduce the amount of surplus the monopolist can extract). We can illustrate this intuition in Figure 2 . We have drawn the profit-maximizing per-unit prices and the corresponding quantity choices of a high and low-demand consumer when the monopolist offers a menu of two-part tariffs. As illustrated, p Ã 2 ¼ c and p Ã 1 4c, which follow from the first-order conditions in (6) and (7). From (4), we have that F 1 Ã equals the shaded area A, and from (5), we have that F 2 Ã equals the shaded area A þ B þ C. To induce self-selection, the monopolist must leave the highdemand consumer a surplus of D þ E.
The monopolist can increase its profit by at least (1 À l)E when it adopts a strategy of bundling because it can always induce self-selection by choosing a menu of bundles with the same quantities that would be chosen under the optimal menu of two-part tariffs, q 1 Ã (p 1 Ã ) and q 2 Ã (p 2 Ã ), a price for the first bundle that is the same as the total payment of the low-demand consumer under the optimal menu of two-part tariffs, A þ p 1
, and a price for the second bundle that exceeds by area E the total payment of the high-demand BUNDLING AND MENUS OF TWO-PART TARIFFS consumer under the optimal menu of two-part tariffs,
Since the high-demand consumer pays more and the low-demand consumer pays the same, the monopolist's profit increases. Of course, the monopolist may be able to do even better by changing the bundled quantities from those that would be induced with two-part tariffs.
III. PROFIT-MAXIMIZING QUANTITIES WITH BUNDLING Spence (1980, 829) conjectured that the quantity consumed by the low-demand consumers would be higher (less distorted) with the profitmaximizing menu of bundles than with the profit-maximizing menu of twopart tariffs (recall that the quantity meant for the high-demand consumers is q 2 e and is without change). 9 This conjecture has some intuitive appeal because menus of price-quantity bundles are more efficient at extracting surplus than menus of two-part-tariffs (and therefore closer to achieving perfect price discrimination), and therefore it would seem that the quantity sold to the low-demand type would be higher (closer to q 1 e ) with the profitmaximizing menu of bundles than with the profit-maximizing menu of twopart tariffs.
10 However, this intuition is incorrect. In what follows, we will After showing that the quantities and prices in the profit-maximizing menu of pricequantity bundles could not be induced by a feasible menu of two-part tariffs, Spence wrote, 'Therefore, the ability to extract revenues from a given bundle of goods (one for each group) is lower under the two-part tariff approach. And this will force the required prices up, on average, and the quantities purchased down.' We will show that this conjecture is incorrect. 10 Recall that with perfect price discrimination, a firm would sell the quantity q e 1 to the low-demand consumers.
derive conditions under which the optimal bundled quantity is higher, lower, and the same for the low-demand consumers compared to what it would be with two-part tariffs.
To see how the monopolist should adjust its quantities, recall that (7) implies that
and (12) implies that the low-demand quantity in the optimal menu of pricequantity bundles solves
If we evaluate the left-hand side of (14) at q 1
) and use (13) and the fact that
then the left-hand side of (14) can be written as
For all l 6 ¼ 1, and using the fact that
we have that the sign of (15) is the same as the sign of
which may be positive, negative, or zero depending on the slope of the high-demand consumer's demand vis a`vis the slope of the low-demand consumer's demand at q 1 Ã (p 1 Ã ), over the range q Since we know from (7) and (12) that q 1 Ã (p 1 Ã ) and1 are less than q 1 e , and since we know from (16) that the sign of1 À q Ã 1 ðp Ã 1 Þ may be positive, negative, or zero, we have that the profit-maximizing menu of price-quantity bundles may yield higher, lower, or the same social welfare as the profitmaximizing menu of two-part tariffs. Since (16) is independent of l, it also BUNDLING AND MENUS OF TWO-PART TARIFFS follows that the social ranking is independent of the number of consumers and relative proportion of each consumer type.
III(i). Illustrative classes of utility functions
We can illustrate the three possible social welfare rankings by considering the class of utility functions V(q, y) that yield linear demand curves. The following proposition gives the results.
Proposition 2. For all utility functions V(q, y) yielding linear demand curves, we haveq
Proof. For all utility functions V(q, y) yielding linear demand curves, Proposition 2 follows immediately from (16) and the fact that q 2 Vðq;yÞ2 is constant for all q. QED Since the second partial derivative of V(q, y) with respect to q is the slope of a type y consumer's demand curve, it follows from Proposition 2 that the social welfare ranking of bundling vis a`vis, two-part tariffs depends only on the slopes of the demand curves. For demand curves that are linear in output, welfare is lower with bundling if and only if the demand curve of the high-demand consumers is steeper than the demand curve of the lowdemand consumers. For demand curves that are linear in output, welfare is higher with bundling if and only if the demand curve of the high-demand consumers is flatter than the demand curve of the low-demand consumers. For linear demand functions that are parallel shifts of one another, welfare is the same in the two cases.
Of particular interest are the conditions under which two-part tariffs yield higher welfare than bundling since these represent conditions under which a ban on bundling could increase welfare. We now consider a second class of utility functions for which the bundled output can be smaller. Indeed, as we will show, for this class of utility functions, output is always smaller with bundling.
Suppose consumers have identical preferences for the monopolist's product, but different incomes. Then, as shown in Tirole (1988, 143) , a consumer's utility from consumption of q40 units of the good gross of any payment to the monopolist can be represented by the class of utility functions V(q, y) 5 f(y)g(q). This is a nice class of functions to consider because the entire heterogeneity in consumers' tastes can be derived solely from differences in their income. Assuming as before that there are two types of consumers with parameters y 1 and y 2 , where y 2 4y 1 , we have:
Proposition 3. For weakly concave demand functions of the class V(q, y) 5 f(y)g(q), the quantity of the good purchased by the low-demand consumers is strictly lower under the optimal menu of price-quantity bundles than under the optimal menu of two-part tariffs. That is,1 oq
Proof. Given the hypothesized class of demand functions, V(q, y) 5 f(y)g(q), we have q Vðq;yÞ¼ f ðyÞg 0 ðqÞ, implying that (16) can be written as
Since f(y 2 )4f(y 1 ), weak concavity of g 0 implies that the expression above is negative. QED Proposition 3 shows that for all utility functions which are multiplicatively separable in output and consumer type (implying that the horizontal axis intercept is independent of y), and have weakly negative third derivatives in output, bundling yields lower output than two-part tariffs.
Example with a lower bundled quantity Propositions 2 and 3 describe different sufficient conditions for quantity to fall with bundling. However, it is important to note that these conditions do overlap. This is evident for the case in which Vðq; yÞ ¼ y aq À , which satisfies both Proposition 2 (first condition) and Proposition 3.
For Vðq; yÞ ¼ y aq À q 2 2 , demand is linear with a horizontal axis intercept that is independent of y and a slope that is decreasing in y. In particular, the low-demand consumer's inverse demand is p 5 y 1 (a À q) and the high-demand consumer's inverse demand is p 5 y 2 (a À q). Using these inverse demands, we can solve for q as a function of p, q i ¼ q
We begin with the case of two-part tariffs. Substitutions into (6) and (7) and solving gives
For the case of bundling, substitutions into (11) and (12) and solving giveŝ
In comparing the solutions for q Ã 2 ðp Ã 2 Þ and2 , we see that the quantity meant for the high-demand consumers is the same, while the quantity meant for the low-demand consumers is strictly lower under the optimal menu of bundles than under the optimal menu of two-part tariffs.
Using the values a 5 10, c 5 6, l 5 2/3, y 1 5 2, and y 2 5 4, we show in the appendix that bundling increases the monopolist's profit by 8% over the optimal menu of two-part tariffs.
Example with a higher bundled quantity
To illustrate the second condition in Proposition 2, suppose Vðq; yÞ ¼ aq À q 2 2y , so that the high-demand consumer's demand curve is flatter than the low-demand consumer's demand curve. For Vðq; yÞ ¼ aq À q 2 2y , demand is linear with a vertical axis intercept that is independent of y and a slope that is increasing in y. In particular, the lowdemand consumer's inverse demand is p ¼ a À We begin with the case of two-part tariffs. Substitutions into (6) and (7) and solving gives
In comparing the solutions for q Ã 2 ðp Ã 2 Þ and2 , we see that the quantity meant for the high-demand consumers is the same, while the quantity meant for the low-demand consumers is strictly higher under the optimal menu of bundles than under the optimal menu of two-part tariffs.
Using the values a 5 10, c 5 6, l 5 2/3, y 1 5 2, and y 2 5 4, we show in the appendix that bundling increases the monopolist's profit by almost 8% over the optimal menu of two-part tariffs.
Example in which both quantities are the same
To illustrate the third condition in Proposition 2, we consider parallel shifts of demand curves. In particular, we let Vðq; yÞ ¼ ayq À q 2 2 , so that demands are q i ¼ q Ã i ðpÞ, where q Ã i ðpÞ ¼ ay i À p; i ¼ 1; 2. In this case, the solution is the same whether we substitute into (6) and (7) or (11) and (12):
Using the values a 5 10, c 5 6, l 5 2/3, y 1 5 2, and y 2 5 4, we show in the appendix that bundling increases the monopolist's profit by almost 51% over the optimal menu of two-part tariffs.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that a firm can earn higher profit with a menu of price-quantity bundles than with a menu of two-part tariffs when inducing self-selection. To illustrate, consider the case of an amusement park where the owner must decide whether to offer two-part tariffs or price-quantity bundles, and suppose that its customers can be segmented into two types. With a menu of two-part tariffs, the firm can segment the two types by letting them choose between a high admissions fee but a low per-unit cost of each ride and a low admissions fee but a high per-unit cost of each ride, where the number of rides is left up to each consumer. Alternatively, the firm can segment the two types by letting them choose between a standard package of a fixed number of rides at a given price (which includes admission) and a premium package which consists of a greater fixed number of rides at a higher price (which includes admission). Of these methods of inducing selfselection, our results imply that the latter offers the greater profit potential.
Our results also imply, however, that the profit-maximizing menu of bundles may be worse for social welfare than the profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs. For example, if consumers have identical preferences for the amusement park's offerings, but different incomes, then, our results imply that welfare will be lower when the owner of the amusement park offers a standard package and premium package than when the owner is constrained to offer a menu of two-part tariffs. This result is surprising because intuition might suggest that the more efficient means of surplus extraction (bundling) would result in a smaller distortion to the low-demand consumers.
We have abstracted from cost considerations in our analysis. It may be that when the cost of implementing a menu of price-quantity bundles is compared to the cost of implementing a menu of two-part tariffs, the latter becomes more profitable. For example, cell-phone companies offer a menu of different rates plans, which are essentially two-part tariffs. In this case, it may be very costly (vis. inefficient) to implement a menu of bundles. On the other hand, cost considerations may also work to favor menus of bundles. Consider the case of a potato chip manufacturer. It would be highly inefficient for the firm to offer a dispensing machine in the grocery store that allowed each consumer to choose her preferred quantity. In this case, we would expect the chip manufacturer to bundle its potato chips in packages of different sizes. Our analysis suggests that even in the absence of these cost considerations, the chip manufacturer might find it more profitable to bundle.
We have assumed the market consists of two consumer types. This assumption is inessential to our results as long as the number of consumer types is finite. To see this, suppose the firm identifies three consumer types (heavy users, medium users, and light users) and decides to offer an option to each. Then, as before, our results suggest that a menu of price-quantity bundles can do better than a menu of two-part tariffs (cost considerations aside) because regardless of the induced quantity choices of the low, medium, and high-demand consumers given the optimal menu of two-part tariffs, the firm can do strictly better by offering these same quantities as bundles at prices such that the amount collected from the low and medium demand consumers is unchanged and the amount collected from the highdemand consumers is increased by a small amount.
Our results would not apply, however, if there were a continuum of consumer types. Intuitively, in a model with a finite number of consumer groups, there is some separation in 'taste' space y between consumer groups, which implies there is money on the table the monopolist can claim by restricting consumer choice using price-quantity bundles. With a continuum of consumers, there is no separation in taste space among consumer types, and a nonlinear price-schedule is optimal (Willig, 1978) . In this case, there is no money left on the table for the monopolist to claim using bundles rather than two-part tariffs and the two pricing mechanisms yield the same outcome.
We have assumed that firms sell directly to consumers. This assumption is inessential. In business-to-business selling, where manufacturers sell to retailers, we can think of the retailers as consumers. In this case, the manufacturer may know that it faces retailers of different sizes but, given existing antitrust laws, e.g., the Robinson-Patman Act, it may not be possible directly to offer discriminatory terms to the large and small retailer. However, as many commentators have pointed out, it is often possible to satisfy antitrust laws against price-discrimination by offering a menu of options and letting each retailer self select.
11 As long as the various options are functionally available to all, our results suggest that a manufacturer can do better by forcing retailers to choose from a menu of price-quantity bundles than by allowing them to choose from among two-part tariffs.
Finally, we have assumed that the firm discriminates among consumers who differ in their quantity demanded of the good at equal prices. But our model also extends to the case in which all consumers demand one unit of the product but differ in their willingness to pay for quality.
12 In this case, our results suggest that the firm should offer a menu of price-quality bundles rather than a menu of two-part tariffs. Suppose, for instance, that a car manufacturer faces two types of consumers, those with a relatively high willingness to pay for quality and those with a relatively low willingness to pay for quality. Then, our results suggest that the car manufacturer should offer a basic car (with a certain set of amenities) and a more luxurious car (with an increased set of amenities), but should not allow consumers to purchase amenities separately. The intuition is that it is harder to induce selfselection if a high-quality consumer can purchase the basic car and upgrade it with additional amenities than if the same consumer is stuck with an eitheror choice.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. The first part of the proof is given in the text following Proposition 1. To complete the proof, we must show that the menu ððq (9) and (10). To do this, it is useful to begin by solving explicitly for
denotes the total payment received by the monopolist from a type i consumer. Since the maximand in (3) is increasing in F 1 and F 2 , we know that F 1 Ã and F 2 Ã must satisfy the constraints in (4) and (5) with equality. Solving for 12 With a simple relabeling of variables, discrimination by quality can be shown to be formally identical to discrimination by quantity. See Maskin and Riley (1984) , who were the first to draw the parallels in the two cases.
Substituting in for T
Vðq
The first set of terms, Vðq
, is a high-demand consumer's net surplus when it faces a two-part tariff ðp 
e., the left-hand side of (A2) is strictly positive. This implies that for e sufficiently small, (A2) is satisfied, which implies that (10) Therefore, we have a percentage increase in profit of 8% for the optimal menu of price-quantity bundles compared to the optimal menu of two-parttariffs.
The diagram on the left shows the solution with the optimal menu of two-part tariffs. The profit on sales to the low-demand consumers is 2 3 A. The profit on sales to the high demand consumers is 1 3 ðA þ B þ CÞ. The first-order conditions in (6) and (7) imply that an infinitesimally small increase in p 1 above p 1 Ã causes a decrease in profit from the lowdemand consumers equal to dq Ã 1 dp1 times the thick vertical line at q 5 6, and an increase in profit from the high-demand consumers equal to the thick horizontal line at p 5 8. At the optimum the gains are exactly offset by the losses.
The diagram on the right shows the solution with the optimal menu of price-quantity bundles. The profit on sales to the low-demand consumers is 2 3 D. The profit on sales to the high-demand consumers is 1 3 ðD þ E þ FÞ. The first-order conditions in (11) and (12) imply that an infinitesimally small decrease in q 1 below1 causes a decrease in the profit from the low-demand consumers equal to the thick vertical line at q 5 4 from p 5 c to p 5 12, and an increase in the profit from the high-demand consumers equal to the thick vertical line at q 5 4 from p 5 12 to p 5 24. The latter interval is twice the length of the former because there are twice as many low-demand consumers.
Example with a higher bundled quantity: Vðq; yÞ ¼ aq À 2. This gives a percentage increase in profit of almost 8% for the optimal menu of price-quantity bundles compared to the optimal menu of two-part-tariffs.
The diagram on the left shows the solution with the optimal menu of two-part tariffs. The profit on sales to the low-demand consumers is 2 3 A. The profit on sales to the high demand consumers is 1 3 ðA þ B þ CÞ. The first-order conditions in (6) and (7) imply that an infinitesimally small increase in p 1 above p 1 Ã causes a decrease in profit from the lowdemand consumers equal to dq Ã 1 dp1 times the thick vertical line at q 5 5.3, and an increase in profit from the high-demand consumers equal to the thick horizontal line at p 5 7.3. At the optimum the gains are exactly offset by the losses.
The diagram on the right shows the solution with the optimal menu of price-quantity bundles. The profit on sales to the low-demand consumers is 2 3 D. The profit on sales to the high demand consumers is 1 3 ðD þ E þ FÞ. The first-order conditions in (11) and (12) imply that an infinitesimally small decrease in q 1 below1 causes a decrease in profit from the low-demand consumers equal to the thick vertical line at q 5 6.4 from p 5 c to p 5 6.8, and an increase in profit from the high-demand consumers equal to the thick vertical line at q 5 6.4 from p 5 6.8 to p 5 8.4. The latter interval is twice the length of the former because there are twice as many low-demand consumers.
Example in which both quantities are the same: Vðq; yÞ ¼ ayq À q 2 2 Figure 5 illustrates the case where a 5 10, c 5 6, l 5 2/3, y 1 5 2, and y 2 5 4. In this case, we get q optimal menu of price-quantity bundles areT T 1 ¼ 72, andT T 2 ¼ 702, and the monopolist's maximized profit is p B 5 198. This yields an increase in profit of almost 51% when the monopolist chooses bundling compared to two-part-tariffs.
Under the optimal menu of two-part tariffs, the profit on sales to low-demand consumers is 2 3 A and the profit on sales to high-demand consumers is 1 3 ðA þ B þ CÞ. By comparison, under the optimal menu of price-quantity bundles, the profit on sales to low-demand consumers is 2 3 A and the profit on sales to high-demand consumers is 1 3 ðA þ B þ C þ DÞ. In this case, bundling yields strictly higher profit, but since the quantities are unchanged, social welfare is unchanged.
